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IN THE SUPREME COllRT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OP UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent.

-v-

Case No. 19082

IRRIAN ORTIZ,
Defendant-Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Ibrian Ortiz, was charged by information
with Aggravated Robbery, a felony in the first degree,

in

violation of Utah Code Ann.§ 76-6-302 (1953 as amended).

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was found guilty of Aggravated Robbery, a
first degree felony,
1983,

in a jury trial held February 14 and 15,

in the Third Judicial District Court in and for salt

Lake County, State of Utah,
presiding.

the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick,

on March 4, 1983, appellant was sentenced to five

years to life at the Utah State Prison and a consecutive
sentence of at least one year, but not more than five for
using a firearm to commit the offense.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order of this court affirming
trip

judgment and sentence of the trial court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the evening of September 20, 1982, Richard
flul lock was the only attendant on duty at the Quality Oil gas
•station and convenience store at 3900 south
Lake City, Utah (T.

9-10),

Mr. Bullock was

qoo

East in salt

in the back room

at approximately 9:00 p.m. when two men entered the building.
Mr. Rul lock returned to the cash register and the two men
approached him.

One pointed a gun at Mr. Bullock and ordered

him to lie down on the floor, which he did (T. 11, 13).

The

two men emptied the cash register and fled from the station.
Mr. Bullock then got up and called the police.
This entire incident was witnessed by Becky Edwards.
Ms. Edwards was just leaving the gas station with her young
daughter as the two men entered.

Because the attendant was in

the back roan and the two men looked suspicious, Ms. Edwards
paid particular attention to the two (T.

47-49).

She returned

to her car located near the station's gas pumps and from there
watched the entire robbery (T.

47-49).

Both Mr. Bullock and Ms. Edwards accurately and
consistently identified appellant as one of the two robbers of
the Quality Oil station.

Immediately following the robbery

Mr. Bullock gave salt Lake City police officers a description
of
22,

the

robbers' appearance and clothing (T.

20-21).

on May

two days after the robbery, Detective James Grant of the

Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office showed Mr. Bullock an array
of

approximately 20 photos (T.

26, 61)
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which Bullock

positively identified appellant as one of the robbers (T.
107--108).

Later that day Detective Grant showed the same

photo array to Ms. Edwards; she too identified appellant as
.one of the robbers (T. 109--109).

Ms. Edwards acknowledged

some question in her mind as to her identification of
appellant because she had seen him with a hat on and found it
difficult to picture him with hair (T.

53--54).

She did

recognize his face (T. 54), however, and by covering up the
hair on all the photographs, Ms. Edwards was able to identify
appellant from the photo array (T.

63--65).

Both Mr. Bullock

anrl Ms. Edwards also positively identified appellant in the
courtroom (T.

15, 52); both witnesses accurately identified

co-defendant Leonardo Rayesl as the other robber (T. 14, 52,
10 5) .
Appellant denied being with co-defendant Rayes on
the evening of the robbery (T. 138) and claimed that he had
spent

that entire evening with Pedro Revas and Santiago Crisbo

(T. 137, 139).

The three men were stopped near 1500 South 200

East, Salt Lake City, by a policeman around 10:30 p.m. that
evening

(T. 118--119)

in response to an earlier report of a

suspicious-looking vehicle near the vicinity of the robbery.
Appellant gave notice of, but was unable to locate, Crisbo to
testify as an alibi witness.

The trial court did not allow

Revas to testify because of the severely inadequate notice

Leonardo Rayes' conviction is currently pending appeal
hefore this court.
-- 3--

qiven to the State the Thursday preceding the Monday trial.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
SINCE NOTICP. OF ALIRI WITNESS PEDRO REVAS
WAS STATUTORILY INSUFFICIENT, REVAS'
TESTIMONY WAS PROPERLY EXCLUDED RY THE
TRIAL JUDGE.
The defense of alibi is governed by Utah Code Ann.
77-14-2 (1953 as amended):
( 1)
A defendant .
• who intends to
offer evidence of an alibi shall, not less
than ten days before trial or at such
other time as the court may allow, file
and serve on the prosecuting attorney a
notice, in writinq, of his intention to
claim alibi.
The notice shall contain
specific information as to the place where
the defendant claims to have been at the
time of the alleged offense and, as
particularly as is known to the defendant
or his attorney, the names and addresses
of the witnesses by whom he proposes to
establish alibi.
The prosecutor has a reciprocal obligation to give ten days'
notice of alibi rebuttal witnesses.

If a party fails to give

pruper not ice within the statutory requirements, "the court
may exclude evidence offered to establish or rebut alibi."
(Subsection (3)).
"[t]he court may,

Subsection (4) of the statute states that
for good cause shown, waive the requirements

of this section."
In the case at bar, the State first received notice
rof

arpellant's only alibi witness on Monday, February 7, 1983,
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when defense counsel disclosed her intent to rely upon the
testimony of Santiago Crisbo (T. 130).

This notice came just

one week prior to the February 14 trial date, but the court
thnt the notice was adequate.

Mr. Crisbo was

subsequently released from the Salt Lake County Jail (his
known residence) before either side had had an opportunity to
interview him.

Upon learning that Pedro Revas was also

incarcerated at the jail, defense counsel telephoned the
prosecutor to let him know of her intent to substitute Revas
for Crisbo (T. 129).

This phone notice came on Thursday

afternoon at approximately 4:00 p.m., February 10, which
preceded a long state holiday weekend (T. 130).

The trial

court held that under these circumstances, with the additional
complication of obtaining an interpreter to be present for an
interview,

it would be an unreasonable burden on the State,

based on the inadequate notice given, to allow Revas to
testify ( T. 133) .
Appellant asserts that the trial court abused its
discretion in not allowing defense counsel to present alibi
witness Pedro Revas, notwithstanding the fact that the State
did not receive notice of this witness until the Thursday
before the Monday trial statutory minimum.

several days short of the ten day

Resides his failure to comply with the

timing requirements of

§

77-14-2, appellant also did not

provide written notice of alibi witness Revas as is required
by

the statute.

This Court need not blindly accept

-5-

oµpellant's mere allegation that the trial court abused its
,J1scretion.

In State v. Larson, Utah, 560 P.2d 335, 336

11q77) this Court stated that the "burden lies on the party
abuse of discretion to make such a showing

No

showing of abuse has been made in the present case.
Decisions based upon the trial court's exercise of
discretion enjoy a great degree of deference when subsequently
challenged.

"[A)s in all discretionary matters, due to his

prerogatives and his advantaged position, the trial court is
allowed considerable latitude in the exercise of that
discretion, which the appellate court will not interfere with
unless it plainly appears that there was abuse thereof."
State v.

Forsyth, Utah,

added).

The trial

560 P.2d 337, 339 (1977).

(Emphasis

judge's rulings are not to be disturbed

absent a showing that the trial judge exceeded his authority
or acted beyond reason.

Peatross v. Board of Commissioners of

Salt Lake County, Utah, 555 P.2d 281,

284 (1976).

Although this Court has not specifically adopted
such a definition, other courts have uniformly held that an
abuse of discretion results only "when no reasonable person
would take the position adopted by the trial court."
v. Averbeck Realty,
(lq79).
kan. App.
rase,

Inc., 92 Wash. 2d 576, 599 P.2d 1289, 1293

see also Lemons v. st. John's Hospital of Salina, 5
2d 161, 613 P.2d 957, 960 (1980).

In the present

while reasonable persons may differ as to whether the

stnte received adequate notice of alibi witness Revas,
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the

rebuttal witnesses had already previously testified

during the State's case-in-chief the defense had been given
"1rnpl1ed prior knowledge" of the content of their testimonies.

•

S85 P. 2d at 448.

No new evidence was offered by these

rebuttal witnesses, but only a clarification of information
which already had been presented at trial.
crincluded that, based upon these facts,

not abused

The court

the trial court had

its discretion by allowing the witnesses to testify

in rebuttal.

The holding of Haddenham, however, should not be

extended beyond its particular facts.

In the case at bar the

State did not have "implied prior knowledge" of Revas'
testimony as that term was restricted to the fact situation in
Haddenham.

The State was given no opportunity to discover the

content of Revas'

testimony; any statements made by Revas at

trial would have created unfair surprise.

Rev as'

testimony

was properly excluded.
state v.
significant
Case the

case, Utah, 547 P. 2d 221 ( 1976) also has

factual distinctions from the case at bar.

In

testimonies offered as rebuttal to the alibi defense

included that of the victim, who had already testified as a
prosecution witness, and that of a witness subpoenaed by the
defense but not called to testify at trial.

The Court

reac; oned that the defendant wou 1 d not be prejudiced by the
testimonies because the defense was in a position to know the
content

of the two witnesses'

testimonies -- the victim's

because she had already testified and was subject to defense
-R-

questioning, and the uncalled defense witness'

because he had

subpoenaed and undoubtedly had been interviewed by the
1Pfense.

Therefore, the trial court was justified in allowing

.these witnesses to testify despite failure of the prosecution
to give advance notice in compliance with the statute.
Thus, this Court has established an exception to the
general rule of ten days'
witnesses.

notice of alibi or rebuttal

In order for a party to fall within this

exception, opposing counsel must know of the content of the
alibi or rebuttal witness'

testimony, either through prior

testimony actually offered at trial or through an opportunity
to question the witness prior to trial.

In the present case,

the State was given no opportunity to discover the content of
Revas'

testimony.

Although Revas was alleged to have been

with appellant on the evening of the robbery, absolutely no
earlier

indication was given by appellant that Revas would be

called as an alibi witness.
Although not a Utah case, the recent decision of
People v. Buono, N.Y. Sup., 469 N.Y.S.2d 311 (1983),
applicable to the present case.

In Buono,

is

the New York

Supreme Court expressly rejected this Court's holding in State
v. Case, 547 P.2d 221, and held that even thouqh the defendant
had provided the name of the witness as a possible alibi, the
prosecutor could not call him as a rebuttal witness without
proper statutory notice.

The Buono court reasoned that the

-9-

defense was entitled to know whom the prosecution would rely
upon in rebuttal; the prosecutor's mere opportunity to know
thP

•

content of a possible witness'

testimony is not enough to

overcome the statutory notice requirement,

See also People v .

Alexander, Mich., 267 N.W. 2d 466, 468-469 (1978).
In the instant case, the State had neither

opportunity to interview Revas, nor actual knowledge of the
defense's intention to call Revas as an alibi witness until
Just a few days before the trial.
inadequate.

The not ice given was

Where proper notice has not been given, the trial

court has discretion to allow or disallow testimony by the
witness.

Absent a showing of abuse of discretion the trial

court's decision should not be reversed,

Therefore, this

Court should affirm Judge Frederick's exercise of discretion
in not allowing Revas to testify.

POINT II
COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT
NOTICE OF AN ALIBI WITNESS DID NOT
CONSTITUTE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL.
Appellant claims that he was prejudiced by
inadequate representation when defense counsel failed to file
not ice of an alibi witness within the statutory deadline, thus
preventing appellant from corroboratinq his alibi.
Arpellant's claim is without merit.
standards applicable to a claim of

-10-

The governing legal
ineffective assistance of

counsel were recently summarized by this Court in Codianna v.
Utah, 660 P. 2d 1101 ( 1983):

•

This Court has previously held in a
murder case involving appointed counsel
that an accused "is entitled to the
assistance of a competent member of the
Bar, who shows a willingness to identify
himself with the interest of the accused
and present such defenses as are available
under the law and consistent with the
ethics of the profession.
State v.
McNicol, Utah, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (1976).
Accord, State v. Gray, Utah, 601 P.2d 918
(1979); Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118,
449 P.2d 241 (1969).
The McNicol test has
a subjective element--"willingness to
identify himself with the interests of the
accused"--and an objective element--"
competent member of the Bar." The
objective element is measured both by
general ability or experience and by
performance in the defense of a particular
case.
Both elements (willingness to
identify with the accused, and competence)
are essential to adequate representation.
The McNicol test, which we reaffirm,
includes all of the requirements the Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
identified in its recent redefinition of
the constitutional requirements of
effective assistance of counsel.
After
rejecting the "sham and mockery" test that
had previously been applied in the Tenth
and other circuits, the court held:
"The
Sixth Amendment demands that defense
counsel exercise the skill, judgment and
diligence of a reasonably competent
defense attorney."
Dyer v. Crisp, 613
r.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir. 1980) (en bane).
Relying on Dyer v. Crisp, supra, and
other authorities, our recent opinion in
State v. Malmrose, Utah, 649 P.2d 56, 58
( 1982), identifies the following
considerations necessary to determine
whether a conviction should be reversed or
set aside on the basis of ineffective
assistance of counsel:
(1) The burden of
establishing inadequate representation is
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..

on the defendant, "and proof of such must
be demonstrable reality and not a
speculative matter."
State v. McNicol,
554 P.2d at 204.
(2)
A lawyer's
"legitimate exercise of judgment" in the
choice of trial strategy or tactics that
did not produce the anticipated result
does not constitute ineffective assistance
of counsel.
State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d at
205.
( 3)
I t must appear that any
deficiency in the performance of counsel
was prejudicial.
State v. Forsyth, Utah,
560 P.2d 337, 339 (1977); Jaramillo v.
Turner, 24 Utah 2d 19, 22, 465 P.2d 343,
34511970).
In this context, prejudice
means that without counsel's error there
was a "reasonable likelihood that there
would have been a different result
State v. Gray, 601 P.2d at 920.
Similarly, as we noted in State v.
Malmrose, 649 P.2d at 58, "the failure of
counsel to make motions or objections
which would be futile if raised does not
constitute ineffective assistance.

660 P.2d at 1109.

These standards parallel those set forth by

the United States Supreme Court in its recent decision of
Strickland v. Washington,
14, 19 84) .

U.S.

, 35 CrL 3066 (decided May

under the Sixth Amendment a defendant is entitled

to "reasonably effective assistance" of counsel.

However, a

reviewing court's analysis of an ineffective assistance claim
is two-tiered.

As stated in Strickland:

A convicted defendant's claim that
counsel's assistance was so defective as
to require reversal of a conviction or
death sentence has two components.
First,
the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient.
This requires
showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning
as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the
defendant must show that the deficient

-1 2-

performance prejudiced the defense.
This
requires showing that counsel's errors
were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose
result is reliable.
Unless a defendant
makes both showings, it cannot be said
that the convict ion or death sentence
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary
process that renders the result
unreliable.

.

35 CrL 3071.
In the case at bar neither deficiency of counsel's
performance nor prejudicial result has been shown by
appellant.

The trial transcript reveals that upon Judge

Frederick's denial of Revas'

testimony, defense

counsel Ms.

Nesset-Sale requested that the record "reflect that the delay
and the noncompliance because of the delay .

[left]

Mr.

Ortiz open for a valid claim of ineffectiveness of counsel"
( T.

131).

The trial

judge, however, would not acknowledge any

claim of incompetency and instead placed the blame for the
lateness of information reqarding Revas on appellant.
trial transcript,

in relevant part, reads as follows:

[MS. NESSET-SALE:]
I do believe that
because of this Court's ruling, Mr. Ortiz'
right to have his defense put on has been
jeopardized, and certainly there is an
i nef fe ct i ve nes s-and- incompetence-ofcou nsel argument that ought to be well
taken by a review in court [of] this
matter.
THE COURT:
The Court certainly
appreciates your position, Ms.
Nesset-Sale.
However, the Court is not
ready to acknowledge any claim of
incompetency or ineffectiveness of
counsel.
I think on the contrary, you
have conducted yourself in a very
journeyman-like manner in the presentation
of the defense in this case •
-13-

The

The record further reflects that Mr.
Ortiz either was or should certainly have
been aware of those persons upon whom he
was going to rely for purposes of
est ab 1 is h ing his alibi or ind iv id ua 1 s with
whom he was personally acquainted in the
vehicle the night of the stop testified to
by Officer Robinson.
Therefore, it
certainly may wel 1 have been the case, and
I don't choose at this time to inquire of
you whether or not it was, but certainly
the Court's view that it may well have
been the case that if there was any blame
to be placed for the lateness of providing
information about the other individual,
Mr. Revas, that you intended to rely upon
at this time, that may well lie on Mr.
Ortiz as opposed to his counsel.

•

(T.

131-132).

In the event that blame is placed on counsel, it is
clear that defense counsel's failure to provide adequate
notice of Revas as an alibi witness resulted from counsel's
trial

tactics, not incompetency.

Defense counsel chose to

call Santiago Crisbo as the only alibi witness, although she
could have given notice of a second potential alibi witness at
the same time,

The record does not indicate the specific

reasons for appellant's counsel's decision not to give earlier
not ice of this second alibi witness.

However, it should be

presumed that counsel had valid, tactical reasons for that
decision.

As noted by the court in State v. Workman, Ariz.

App., 600 P.2d 1133 (1979):
courts distinguish between counsel
failing to act because of ignorance of the
facts or the law, and failing to act
despite his knowledge of the facts or law.
In the latter situation, counsel is
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presumed to have made an informed
decision, even where the tactical
advantage is not readily apparent to the
appellate court.
Especially when the question is
whether or not to call a particular
witness, courts are reluctant to
second-guess the attorney.
There are
factors that do not readily appear on
record that can lead an attorney to decide
that a particular witness is undesirable
or that his participation in the defense
may harm the defendant more than his
testimony, even if it provides an alibi,
will aid him.
600 P.2d at 1135.
Defense counsel originally chose not to rely on
Revas as an alibi witness, and this Court should not
sec ond-g ues s the reasoning behind that decision.

When her

original witness, Crisbo, was unavailable to testify, only
then did appellant's counsel give notice of Revas.
however, it was too late to comply with the statute.

By then,
Defense

counsel's trial tactics in relying on Crisbo did not produce
the desired result, but this failure must not be interpreted
as inef feet ive assistance of counsel.

"A contrary conclusion

would be merely speculative and the appellant presents no
evidence to support one."

State v. White, Utah, 671 P.2d 191,

194 (1983).
With respect to the defendant's burden to show
preJudice if he or she is able to show that particular errors
of counsel were unreasonable, the Supreme Court stated:
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•

Even if a defendant shows that particular
errors of counsel were unreasonable,
therefore, the defendant must show that
they actually had an adverse effect on the
defense.
It is not enough for the defendant to
show that the errors had some conceivable
effect on the outcome of the proceeding.
Virtually every act or omission of
counsel would meet that test, cf. United
States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U-:-s:-858,
866-867 (1982), and not every error that
conceivably could have influenced the
outcome undermines the reliability of the
result of the proceeding.
The defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been
different.
A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.

Strickland v. Washington, 35 CrL at 3073.
Setting aside appellant's failure to show that
counsel's error was unreasonable, appellant has made no
showing of prejudice to the extent that the outcome of the
trial would have been effected.

The trial record contains

consistent eyewitness identification of appellant as a
participant

in the robbery (T. 15, 52, 108-109).

has not shown a

Appellant

reasonable probability the jury's decision

would have been effected substantially by Revas'

testimony had

he been allowed to testify as an alibi witness.

Rather, the

evidence was sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction
despite his alleged a 1 ibi.

The requirements for a showing of

inPffective assistance of counsel, as mandated by this Court

-lli-

in Codianna and by the United States Supreme Court in
Strickland,
should he

have not been satisfied.

Appellant's conviction

u phe 1 d .

•
CONCLUSION
The trial judge, Judge Frederick, properly exercised
t.is discretion in disallowing alibi testimony by Pedro Revas.
The statutorily imposed notice as to Revas was severely
deficient, and did not provide ample time for the prosecutor
to prepare rebuttal testimony,
discretion,

Absent a showing of abuse of

the trial court's decision should be upheld.

The insufficiency of notice must not be attributed
to inadequacy of counsel, but rather was the result of trial
tactics which failed to produce the desired result.
counsel was not

ignorant of Revas'

testimony, but

chose to rely upon another alibi witness.

Defense

instead

counsel's inability

to locate Crisbo and the resulting insufficient notice as to
Revas
of

is in no way a reflection upon counsel's representation

appellant.

Moreover, the evidence presented at trial

established appellant's guilt and no showing was made that a
different result was reasonably probable had Revas' alleged
alibi testimony been permitted.
Judgment

Based upon the foregoing,

the

and sentence of the trial court should be affirmed.
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